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]LME COLUMN

Currents in Contemporary Ethics
The Confidentiality and
Privacy Implications of
Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging
StaceyA. Tovino
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is the Herbert F Boehl Chair of Law
and Medicine and the Director of the
Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy
and Law at the University of Louisville
School of Medicine in Kentucky.
(mark.rothstein@louisville.edu)

Advances in science and technology
frequently raise new ethical, legal,
and social issues, and developments
in neuroscience and neuroimaging
technology are no exception. Within
the field of neuroethics, leading scientists, ethicists, and humanists are
exploring the implications of efforts
to image, study, treat, and enhance
the human brain.'
This article focuses on one aspect
of neuroethics: the confidentiality
and privacy implications of advances
in functional magnetic resonance
imaging ("fMRI"). Following a brief
orientation to fMRI and an overview
of some of its current and proposed
uses, this article highlights key confidentiality and privacy issues raised
by fMRI in the contexts of health
care, research, employment, insurance, criminal justice, litigation,land
cognitive privacy.
Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging
Magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI")
uses radiofrequency waves and a
strong magnetic field to provide detailed images of internal organs and
tissues. Functional MRI is based on
the same technology as MRI. However, instead of imaging static, softtissue structures, fMRI measures localized changes in the brain that
occur when an individual performs a
mental task, such as viewing an
image, responding to a question, or
listening to a voice. By subtracting a
control image from an experimental
image, physicians and scientists can
create maps showing the regions of
the brain to which a surplus of oxygenated blood flows when an indi2
vidual performs a task.

Functional MRI has several clinical applications. Preoperatively,
physicians and scientists use fMRI

to study patients while they complete
a battery of mental tasks and to identify the regions of the brain that are
associated with tactile, motor, language, and visual functions. 3 Scientists believe these cortical maps can
help neurosurgeons assess surgical
risk, plan surgical routes, and direct
intraoperative electrophysiological
procedures,4 although others caution
against the leap from functional im5
aging to functional neurosurgery.
Scientists also use fMRI to examine the physiological correlates of
well-known social psychological
phenomena. For example, several
groups of scientists have used fMRI
to explore the neural substrates involved when research subjects view
6
faces of white and black individuals.
In one study, the authors concluded
that representations of social groups
that differ in race evoke differential
amygdala activity related to unconscious social evaluation. 7 Although
the authors stated that their results
cannot be taken as a means of testing
for racism in individuals, others
speculate that refinement of fMRI
technology could unveil racial preferences and prejudices."
The neural correlates of deception
also have been studied using fMRI. 9
In one popular study, scientists asked
subjects to hold a 5 of Clubs playing
card in their pocket and to deny that
they held the card while their brains
were being imaged. 10 The scientists
concluded that cognitive differences
between deception and truth have
neural correlates detectable by fMRI
and that refinements in study design
could establish an activation pattern
predictive of deception on an individual level. Although some scientists and ethicists caution against
premature use of fMRI to detect de12
ception in non-research settings,
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other individuals speculate that
fMRI might enable government and
criminal justice officials to determine
whether criminal suspects and terrorists are lying or telling the truth.13
Scientists also have used fMRI to
study the neural correlates of altruism and social cooperation.

4

In one

study involving two separate experiments, scientists scanned the brains
of thirty-six women as they played
the Prisoner's Dilemma, a game in
which two players independently
choose whether to cooperate with
each other or betray each other for
immediate gain.' 5 The scientists con-

cluded that mutual cooperation was
associated with consistent activation
in regions of the brain linked to reward processing.' 6 Others speculate
that employers might want to use
fMRI to recruit applicants for employment who experience more or
less pleasure from cooperation, depending on the requirements of the
job.'

7

Functional MRI has been used to
study a range of other conditions and
characteristics including, but certainly not limited to, Alzheimer's
disease,' major depression,' 9 schizophrenia, 20 bipolar disorder,2 ' dyslexia
and hyperlexia, 2 2 minimal consciousness, 23 pedophilia,2 4 cocaine
26
25
addiction, compulsive gambling,
2
27
satiety and obesity, extraversion,

self-consciousness 29 maternal and
3
romantic love,30 and sexual arousal, '
as well as individuals' preferences re33
3

2

garding soft drinks, automobiles,
campaign advertisements, 34 and the
35
content of movie trailers.

Confidentiality Implications
An oft-stated principle is that physicians and scientists have an ethical
and legal duty to maintain the confidentiality of medical and study
records in their possession. Applying existing confidentiality obligations to neuroimages and related
data sets, reports, and interpretations (collectively, "neuroimaging information") raises several questions.
First, do existing confidentiality protections apply to the growing number of scientists who create, use, and
disclose neuroimaging information?
Second, do existing protections apply

to neuroimaging information that is
interpreted to reveal social qualities
and characteristics, but not particular physical or mental conditions?
Third, when is neuroimaging information individually identifiable?
Finally, how can scientists disclose
neuroimaging information to neuroimaging databanks in accordance
with publication requirements and
peer suggestion without violating
confidentiality requirements?
The Department of Health and
Human Services' standards for the
privacy of individually identifiable
health information (the "Privacy
Rule") 36 will apply to some, but not
all, of the individuals and institutions
that create, maintain, or desire to obtain neuroimaging information. Very

ployers, life insurance companies, litigants, and marketing companies.
Understanding how the Privacy
Rule applies to the growing number
of scientists who use fMRI technology can be confusing. The Privacy
Rule generally does not apply to: (1)
scientists who do not provide health
care as part of their research; and (2)
scientists who do provide health care
but who do not electronically bill for
such health care or do not otherwise
transmit health information in electronic form in connection with a
standard transaction.4 0 However, the
Privacy Rule does apply to the scientists described in the preceding sentence if they are employees or workforce members of a university that:
(1) is a single legal entity; (2) has a

Do existing confidentiality protections apply to the
growing number of scientists who create, use, and
disclose neuroimaging information?
generally, the Privacy Rule regulates
covered entities' use and disclosure
37
of protected health information.
Covered entities include health care
providers who transmit health information in electronic form in connection with certain standard transactions, as well as health plans and
health care clearinghouses.38
Many health care providers (including hospitals, imaging centers,
radiologists, and neurosurgeons)
transmit health information in electronic form in connection with
claims sent to health insurers for reimbursement and other standard
transactions. These health care
providers, as well as the health insurance companies to which the
providers' claims are sent, constitute
covered entities and must maintain
the confidentiality of their protected
health information in accordance
with the Privacy Rule or risk civil and
criminal penalties. 39 However, the
Privacy Rule generally does not apply
to many other individuals and institutions reported to have an interest
in neuroimaging information, including federal and state governments, criminal justice officials, em-
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health care component, such as a
clinic or hospital; and (3) has not
designated the scientists as part of
the non-health care component in
accordance with the Privacy Rule's
provisions relating to hybrid entities. 41 Thus, the Privacy Rule will

apply to some, but not all, scientists.
The Privacy Rule regulates covered entities' use and disclosure of
protected health information.4

2

A

second issue is whether neuroimages
that are used to study (or are interpreted to reveal) social characteristics that do not rise to the level of
physical or mental conditions are
protected by the Privacy Rule. In relevant part, the Privacy Rule defines
health information as information
that relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or
condition of an individual, or the
provision of health care to an individual. 43 A neuroimage that shows

the precise location of a brain tumor
or an arteriovenous malformation
certainly relates to the present physical condition of an individual and
would constitute health information
under the Privacy Rule.
But, what about a neuroimage that
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is taken for the purpose of studying
one-time deception that does not
constitute pathological lying ("I do
not have the 5 of Clubs card")? What
about a neuroimage that shows
amygdala activity interpreted as unconscious social evaluation? What
about a neuroimage that is interpreted to reveal an individual's preference for a particular soft drink, automobile, campaign advertisement,
or movie trailer? A very technical argument exists that these latter pieces
of neuroimaging information do not
constitute health information under
the Privacy Rule because they do not
relate to the physical or mental
health or condition of an individual
or the provision of health care to an
individual.
A third issue is whether neuroimaging information is individually identifiable. The Privacy Rule
only protects health information if it
is individually identifiable, meaning
that the information identifies the
individual who is its subject or there
is a reasonable basis to believe that
the information could be used to
identify the individual.4 4 Neuroimaging information that contains
a patient's name, telephone number,
social security number, medical
record number, account number, or
other similar identifier generally is
considered individually identifi45
able.
When is neuroimaging information sufficiently de-identified such
that a covered entity can use and
disclose the information without regulation by the Privacy Rule? The Privacy Rule contains a de-identification safe harbor that requires
removal of eighteen different types of
identifiers before data is considered
de-identified. 46 Satisfying the deidentification safe harbor in the context of neuroimaging is slightly more
difficult than in the traditional medical record context because of reports
that individuals' facial features can
be reconstructed from high resolution fMRIs.4 7 Because the Privacy
Rule's safe harbor requires removal
of full-face photographs and comparable images, covered entities also
must remove from neuroimaging information any data or voxels from

which an individual's face can be recognized or reconstructed.
As a condition of publication, the
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
requires its authors to submit their
complete fMRI study data to the
fMRI Data Center, a neuroimaging
databank located in Hanover, New
Hampshire. 4 At least two other

journals strongly encourage submis-

sure that, "[wihen appropriate, there
are adequate provisions to...protect
the confidentiality of [subjects']
data."5 2 The Office for Human Research Protections has stated that
the "adequate provisions" language
in the Common Rule requires investigators to replace names and
other identifiers with codes and to
store paper and electronic research

Because the Privacy Rule's safe harbor requires
removal of full-face photographs and comparable
images, covered entities also must remove from
neuroimaging information any data or voxels from
which an individual's face can be recognized or
reconstructed.
sion of complete study data to neuroimaging databanks to support the
findings, outcomes, and claims in the
journals' published articles, and
some scientists encourage the disclosure of neuroimaging information to neuroimaging databanks to
speed the understanding of cognitive
processes and the neural substrates
that underlie them. 49 Thus, a fourth
issue is how covered entities can disclose neuroimaging information to
neuroimaging databanks without violating the Privacy Rule. The Privacy
Rule allows covered entities to disclose de-identified information to
databanks without the prior written
authorization of the individuals who
are the subjects of the information50
Accordingly, if a covered entity removes from the data it sends to a
databank all eighteen identifiers
listed in the Privacy Rule's de-identification safe harbor, including any
data from which a subject's face can
be recognized or reconstructed, the
Privacy Rule would allow the disclosure to the databank.

51

Several other laws establish confidentiality protections that may apply
to individuals who create, maintain,
or desire to obtain neuroimaging information. For example, federal protection of human subjects regulations (the "Common Rule") requires
institutional review boards approving federally-funded research to en-

records securely. 53 Unlike the Privacy
Rule, the Common Rule protects all
federally-funded, human subject
study data,54 not just health information in the possession of covered
entities. Similar to the Privacy Rule,
the Common Rule contains a deidentification standard that would
require the removal of data from
which the identity of the subject can
or may be readily ascertained, including data or voxels from which an
individual's face can be recognized
55
or reconstructed.
In addition to federal confidentiality protections, many states have
medical practice acts, hospital licensing laws, imaging center licensing laws, and other similar laws and
regulations that require certain individuals and institutions to maintain
the confidentiality of health information in their possession. These
laws typically define health information as information that relates to the
diagnosis, treatment, or prognosis of
patients.5 6 However, many of these
laws do not: (1) extend their protections to scientists who do not provide health care to patients; (2) state
whether their protections extend to
social information in addition to
health information; or (3) specify
whether, or the conditions under
which, a provider may disclose neu-

roimaging information to a neuroimaging databank.
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In summary, advances in neuroimaging raise a number of confidentiality issues. Which existing
confidentiality laws protect social information created and maintained
by non-provider scientists? Does the
Common Rule adequately protect
the confidentiality of neuroimaging
information in the possession of scientists? Should Congress or state legislatures enact new laws providing
heightened confidentiality protections for neuroimaging information?
If so, how would such laws define the
neuroimaging information to be protected?5 7 How would we reconcile
such heightened protections with
other laws that allow the disclosure
of confidential information without
authorization for certain public policy purposes? 58 Would heightened
confidentiality protections for neuroimaging information suggest that
all neuroimaging information is sensitive or stigmatizing, even though it
may not be? 59 Finally, what lessons
can we learn from federal and state
efforts to establish heightened confidentiality protections
for genetic in60
formation?
Privacy Implications
Patients voluntarily disclose some information to health care providers to
obtain health care, and human subjects consent to scientists' obtaining
some personal information during
research studies. But, what if a
provider or scientist discovers a condition that the patient or subject
would have preferred to keep private? Recent studies analyze the extent to which scientists have discovered arteriovenous malformations,
brain tumors, developmental abnormalities, and other conditions in
healthy controls who participate in
neuroimaging research. 61 The question becomes, can fMRI violate an
individual's interest in keeping certain information private? Physicians
and scientists might be able to minimize an individual's perception that
her privacy has been violated by
identifying, as part of the informed
consent process, the type of information potentially discoverable by
fMRI, and by negotiating a notification and treatment referral process

to be followed in the62event of an
unanticipated finding.
Although the cost to employers of
conducting their own fMRI tests
likely would be prohibitive, employers might be interested in obtaining
the results of past fMRI tests to assist
in decision making relating to the se63
lection and retention of employees.
Thus, the issue in the employment
context is whether applicants for employment and employees have the
ability to keep their neuroimaging
information private or whether they
can be forced to reveal such information pursuant to a compelled authorization. A handful of laws regulate employers' use of employment
tests, medical examinations, and related inquiries. Two examples include Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (the 'ADA!') 64 and the
Employee Polygraph Protection
Act.

65

Among other activities, Title I of
the ADA regulates certain employers' use of qualification standards,
employment tests and other selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out individuals with disabilities on the basis of such disabilities
(the "screening provisions"). 66 Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations interpreting Title I define disabilityto include
physical and mental impairments
(including neurological disorders,
mental illnesses, and specific learning disabilities) that substantially
limit one or more major life activities
of an individual. 67 EEOC regulations
also clarify, however, that pedophilia,
compulsive gambling, homosexuality, and certain other characteristics
do not constitute disabilities protected by the ADA. 68 The result is
that the ADA's screening provisions
would regulate a covered employer's
use of fMRI in an attempt to screen
out individuals who have depression,
schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder if
such conditions substantially limit
a major life activity of the individuals tested. On the other hand, the
screening provisions would not regulate attempts to screen out individuals based on fMRI "findings" of pedophilia, compulsive gambling, and
homosexuality.
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Title I of the ADA also regulates
the conduct and timing of medical
examinations and inquiries. 69 The
EEOC has issued enforcement guidance that defines a medical examination as a procedure or test that
seeks information about an individual's health or physical or mental impairments. 70 Although a number of
factors are relevant in determining
whether a procedure or test is a medical examination, the EEOC clarifies
that the term includes tests that provide evidence leading to the identification of conditions listed in the
American Psychiatric Association's
most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, including anxiety, depression, and certain compulsive disorders that have
been studied by fMRI.71 The EEOC
also clarifies, however, that psychological tests designed and used only
to measure honesty, tastes, and
habits are not medical examinations. 72 A determination of how the
ADA!s medical examination and inquiry provisions apply to particular
fMRI tests will require application
of the factors and interpretations set
forth by the EEOC in its enforcement
guidance.
With some exceptions, the federal
Employee Polygraph Protection Act
("EPPA") prohibits employers from
requiring employees to submit to liedetector tests, 73 defined to include
polygraphs, deceptographs, voice
stress analyzers, psychological stress
evaluators, and "any other similar
device.. .that is used, or the results of
which are used, for the purpose of
rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of
an individual."74 Thus, the EPPA
could be interpreted to prohibit employers from requiring neuroimaging examinations that could form the
basis of an opinion regarding an individual's dishonesty.
Functional MRI has privacy implications beyond the health care, research, and employment contexts. In
the insurance context, the concern is
that health, life, and auto insurers
will use individuals' neuroimaging
information in an attempt to predict
future illness, a propensity to violence, or other conditions or charac-

CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS

teristics relevant to underwriting decisions.75Is special legislation or regulation needed to prevent the gathering or use of neuroimaging
information by insurance companies? 76 If so, how can recent legislative efforts to restrict the use of genetic information by health and life
insurers guide efforts to protect the
privacy of neuroimaging informa77
tion?
In the criminal justice and civil litigation contexts, the issue is whether
fMRI has the potential to violate the
privacy rights of individuals suspected ofbeing terrorists, individuals
suspected of engaging in other criminal activity, and participants in civil
litigation.78 For example, does an
fMRI of a criminal suspect's brain
constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment? 79 Could an fMRI of a
criminal defendant's brain violate
her Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination? 80 Can counsel use fMRI during
voir dire to exclude jurors whose
neuroimages are interpreted to reveal racial prejudices?"' Finally, and
regardless of the context, do all individuals have the right to cognitive
privacy, or the privacy of their own
thoughts? 82 Can state action that
punishes an individual or holds an
individual responsible for thoughts,
but not actions, violate the individ83
ual's cognitive privacy?
Although neuroimaging research
has improved our understanding of
the neural bases of personality, behavior, and consciousness, it raises
additional questions relating to the
concept of the self, emotional and
moral judgment, prediction of future
illness, unanticipated findings, truth
telling, social and legal responsibility
and, central to this article, confidentiality and privacy. Existing confidentiality and privacy protections
tend to be tied to the concepts of
physical and mental health, not individuals' thoughts, preferences, and
social conduct. Identification of potential gaps in coverage can inform
policy discussions about the need to
protect social qualities and characteristics and to promote mental autonomy as attempts to transfer fMRI

technology beyond the research context are made.
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